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Budgetary Effects  
of Including the CEC into Dynamic Modulation 
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Summary 
The EU Commission suggests to exclude CEC from the dynamic 
modulation mechanism, being part of the MTR package. This article 
looks at the distributional aspects of including the CEC into 
dynamic modulation. Under the current accession proposal the CEC 
would account for only 18% of the rural development budget by 
2006. If modulation would be realised with the CEC being excluded 
this share would drop to 14% by 2010. According to the criteria 
proposed by the Commission for the distribution of the modulation 
budget the CEC would get a higher share of the modulation budget 
if they were included as they account for high shares in agricultural 
area and employment, and their GDP per capita is relatively low. 
Based on the assumptions made for this article they would be 
eligible for about 66% of the modulation budget. As a result of their 
participation in the modulation mechanism their share in the rural 
development budget would be at 30% by 2010. The financial net 
gains for the CEC from participation are estimated to be at 1.7 bln. €. 
Key words: Modulation; EU-enlargement; CAP-budget 
Budget Auswirkungen einer Einbeziehung der MOEL  
in die dynamische Modulation 
Die Europäische Kommission schlägt vor, die MOEL nicht in die im 
Rahmen der MTR vorgesehene dynamische Modulation einzubezie-
hen. In diesem Artikel werden die Auswirkungen einer Einbeziehung 
der MOEL im Hinblick auf die Finanzflüsse zwischen den Mitglied-
staaten untersucht. Bei einer Umsetzung des gegenwärtigen Ver-
handlungsvorschlags der Kommission für die Osterweiterung hät-
ten die MOEL einen Anteil von etwa 18% am Budget für die ländliche 
Entwicklung. Bei einer Umsetzung der Kommissionsvorschläge für 
die dynamische Modulation würde dieser Anteil bis 2010 auf 14% 
sinken. Auf Basis der von der Kommission vorgeschlagenen Krite-
rien würden die MOEL bei einer Teilnahme jedoch einen hohen An-
teil an den im Rahmen der Modulation umverteilten Mitteln erhalten, 
da sie hohe Anteile an der landwirtschaftlichen Fläche und Bevölke-
rung und ein relativ niedriges Pro-Kopf-Einkommen aufweisen. Auf 
Basis der hier getroffenen Annahmen hätten sie einen Anteil von 
etwa 66% an den Mitteln der Modulation. Bei einer Einbeziehung der 
MOEL würde ihr Anteil am EU-Gesamtbudget für die ländliche Ent-
wicklung bis 2010 auf 30% steigen und es ergäbe sich ein um 1.7 
Mrd. € höherer Nettorückfluss aus dem EU-Budget. 
Schlüsselwörter: Modulation; EU-Erweiterung; EU-Haushalt  
In its Mid-term Review (MTR) the EU Commission 
suggests to reduce direct payments for the EU-15 by 20% 
until 2010 and to fully shift budgetary savings to the second 
pillar of the CAP – measures summarized under the title 
“rural development”. The money saved is to be 
redistributed among EU-15 members for measures of rural 
development according to “agricultural area, agricultural 
employment and a prosperity criterion”
1). The Commission 
suggests to exclude Central European countries (CEC) from 
the dynamic modulation-mechanism (Agra Europe, 2002). 
This sounds reasonable, as direct payments for the CEC, 
                                                                        
1) For an analysis of distributional effects among EU 15 members see 
KLEINHANSS (2002). 
according to the Commission’s draft proposal for accession, 
will be lower than those of the EU-15 in the first years of 
membership anyhow. But do CEC really profit from this 
exclusion, and does it make sense in the light of the current 
distribution of rural development expenditures in the EU-15 
and that foreseen under the accession proposal? 
Much well-founded criticism about the sense of the 
modulation-mechanism itself is in place: EU co-financing 
of measures with mainly local effects is not compatible 
with sound principles of subsidiarity and fiscal equivalence. 
Also the link between the financial extension of the second 
pillar and the dismantling of the first pillar is rather 
artificial. Furthermore and to a significant extent, the rural 
development package contains subsidies with an unclear 
justification just as the first pillar of the CAP. These more 
fundamental aspects of the modulation mechanism are 
discussed elsewhere (GRETHE, 2002). This article 
concentrates on the potential budgetary impacts of an 
inclusion of the CEC into dynamic modulation. 
According to the criteria proposed by the Commission, 
CEC would be eligible to a large share of the rural 
development budget: They account for about 31% of 
agricultural area and 57% of agricultural employment, and 
their GDP per capita is projected to be at 50% of the EU-
average by 2010, the year in which 20% modulation will be 
realized (cf. Table, columns (1) to (3)). A final key for 
redistributing the savings in direct payments in the 2
nd pillar 
is not yet fixed and will be part of the negotiating package 
of the MTR. In order to summarize the three criteria 
proposed by the Commission provisionally a simple 
average of the shares in area and employment adjusted by 








area share + empl. share
relative GDP pc
; ms = member state Share in rural development budget




The result is presented in column (5): the CEC would be 
eligible for about 66% of the rural development budget. 
Other weighting schemes for the criteria proposed are of 
course conceivable and would lead to different results. A 
reduction of the weight of employment versus area would 
reduce the CEC-share, as would a lower impact of the 
GDP. The lower limit, as long as no additional criteria are 
chosen, would be the area share of 31% if employment and 
GDP are not taken into account. 
How does this contrast with the distribution of the EU 
budget for rural development without any modulation? To 
answer this question the rural development budget under 
the Guarantee and Guidance sections of the EAGFL as well 
as the rural development budget proposed by the 
Commission for the CEC for 2006, distributed according to 
SAPARD-key, are taken into account, see column (6). 
Without any modulation the CEC would account for only 
about 18% of the rural development budget in 2006. In a Copyright: www.gjae-online.de
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situation with dynamic modulation being limited to the EU-
15 only, the share of the CEC would decrease further – 
being in sharp contrast to the criteria proposed by the 
Commission. How much would the CEC gain under the 
second pillar, if they would be included in modulation, and 
to what extent would they lose through the cuts in direct 
payments? 
Assumptions on the Development of Direct Payments in EU-15 
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Graph 
In order to assess these questions quantitatively two 
scenarios have been specified. Under both scenarios 
dynamic modulation is introduced in the EU-15 according 
to the MTR proposal, i.e. all direct payments are reduced 
progressively in arithmetic steps of 3% per year to reach 
20% in 2010. The graph illustrates the development of the 
level of direct payments in the EU-15. Starting in 2004, the 
EU-15 level of direct payments is gradually reduced and 
from 2010 on remains at 80% of the 2003 base level. The 
CEC become full members in 2004 and under the first 
scenario direct payments are introduced according to the 
Commission's Draft Common Proposal beginning with 25% 
in 2004, 30% in 2005 and 35% in 2006 of the EU-15 base-
level (cf. graph, line "CEC-10 w/o Modulation"). For the 
remaining period after 2006, direct payments are increased 
by equal steps ensuring that by 2013 the CEC reach the 
support level then applicable in the EU-15. In the year 2010 
the level of direct payments in the CEC is at 61% of the 
EU-15 base-level. As the CEC are excluded from 
modulation under this option, the amounts saved by 
modulation will be distributed amongst the EU-15 members 
only. Under the second scenario the CEC are included in 
the modulation mechanism, i.e. the same reduction rates as 
in the EU-15 apply to their direct payments. As a result, 
direct payments in 2004 start not at 25% but at 24.3% (97% 
of 25%) of the base level and will reach 49% of the base-
level in 2010 (see line "CEC-10 with Modulation" in the 
graph). The amounts saved by modulation are now 
distributed amongst the EU-25 member countries. 
In order to quantify the amounts saved in the first pillar 
by the reductions of direct payments the quantitative 
framework of ESIM (European Simulation Model) was 
used
2). The € 5000 franchise proposed by the EU-Com-
mission is taken into account by adjusting the reduction 
                                                                        
2) For a detailed description of ESIM see MÜNCH (2002). 
Table: Potential Criteria and Redistribution Keys for "Savings" in Direct Payments into the 2
nd Pillar of the CAP and 
Potential Budgetary Impact in 2010 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
  Utilized.  Agric.  GDP p.c.   Key for Redistribution  Shares in  Direct Payments  Rural Development  Direct Payment  Net Effect 
  Agric.  Employ  (PPP)   Rural  De-     and  of  Including 
Coutry,  Area       velopment     Rural  Development  CEC 
  (2000) (2000) (2010) EU-15 EU-25  Budget  w/o  (2010)  (2010)  (2010)  (2010) 
        a n y   M o d u -  
            lation  w/o Mod.  with Mod.   w/o Mod.  with Mod.   w/o Mod.  with Mod. 
              in CEC   in CEC   in CEC   in CEC   in CEC   in CEC 
  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (Mill. €)  (Mill. €)  (Mill. €)  (Mill. €)  (Mill. €)  (Mill. €)  (Mill. €) 
Belgium  0.7 0.5  123.6  1.0  0.3  1.0 230 230 119 103 350 334 -16 
Denmark  1.4 0.6  130.1  1.4  0.5  0.7 478 478 107  83 585 562 -23 
Germany  9.0  6.1  120.5  12.2  4.1  16.3  2 739  2 739  1 909  1 705  4 648  4 445  -203 
Greece  2.7  4.3  81.9  9.1  2.8  2.9  1 421  1 421  533  372  1 954  1 793  -161 
Spain  13.4  6.3  95.9  19.1  6.7  7.8  2 634  2 634  1 279  967  3 913  3 601  -311 
France  15.7  6.2  114.8  17.4  6.3  10.4  4 256  4 256  1 484  1 204  5 740  5 460  -280 
Ireland  2.3  0.8  120.0 2.4 0.9 3.8  620  620  428  390  1  048  1  010 -38 
Italy  8.1  7.0  114.5  13.2  4.3  16.5  2 119  2 119  1 954  1 731  4 074  3 850  -224 
Luxembourg  0.1  0.0  177.5  0.0  0.0  0.2 14 14 19 18 33 32 -1 
Netherlands  1.0 1.5  124.6  2.2  0.7  0.9 246 246 150 112 396 357 -38 
Austria  1.8 1.4  123.3  2.6  0.9  5.3 326 326 585 542 911 868 -43 
Portugal  2.0 3.9  90.6  7.2  2.2  5.5 278 278 727 599  1  005 877  -128 
Finland  1.2 0.9  114.8  1.8  0.6  5.2 205 205 552 522 757 726 -31 
Sweden  1.6 0.8  115.0  1.9  0.7  2.1 348 348 251 220 598 567 -31 
UK  8.3  2.7  114.8  8.6  3.1  3.0  2 252  2 252  526  390  2 778  2 642  -136 
Czech  Rep.  2.3 1.2  74.4    1.5  0.8 418 337  76 123 493 460 -33 
Hungary  3.1 1.4  61.9    2.4  1.3 615 503 130 205 745 708 -37 
Poland  9.6  17.2  48.2    18.3  6.0  1 712  1 689  578  1 146  2 290  2 835  545 
Slovakia  1.3 0.8  60.1    1.1  0.6 206 166  63  97 269 264  -5 
Slovenia  0.3  0.5  82.5    0.3  0.2 32 31 22 31 54 63  9 
Estonia  0.5  0.2  48.8    0.5  0.4 43 41 42 57 84 98 14 
Latvia  1.3 0.8  38.5    1.8  0.8 114 110  75 130 189 240  50 
Lithuania  1.8 1.7  42.4    2.7  1.1 244 235 102 187 346 421  75 
Bulgaria  2.9 2.2  32.3    5.2  1.8 532 499 179 340 710 839 129 
Romania  7.8  31.0  39.6    32.2  5.3  2 254  2 170  516  1 517  2 770  3 687  917 
EU-15  69.2  43.1  113.7    34.1  81.6  18 166  18 166  10 623  8 958  28 789  27 124  -1 665 
CEC-10  30.8  56.9  49.9    65.9  18.4  6 169  5 781  1 781  3 834  7 950  9 616  1 665 
EU-25  100.0  100.0  100.0  100  100  100.0  24 335  23 948  12 404  12 792  36 740  36 740  0 
Sources: (1)+(2) European Commission (2001a), (3) WEISE et al. (2002), (6) For Guarantee: European Commission (1999), For Guidance: European Commission (2001b), (4), 
(5) and (7)-(13) own calculations. Copyright: www.gjae-online.de
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rates for the share of small producers as an approximation 
for the share of producers falling within the franchise. For 
example, if the share of small producers is 33% the annual 
reduction of the sum of total direct payments under the 
modulation-mechanism is only 2% instead of 3%. 
Columns (7)-(13) of the table display the results of both 
scenarios for the year 2010, the final year of the 
implementation of dynamic modulation. All amounts are in 
real prices of the year 2000. Under the first scenario, where 
the saved amounts of modulation are only distributed 
amongst the EU-15 countries, 10.6 bln. € will be available 
for rural development in 2010 within the EU-15 countries, 
see col. (9). The largest shares are for Italy (18%), Germany 
(18%), France (14%) and Spain (12%). After accession the 
new member countries will receive 1.8 bln. € for rural 
development. Out of that amount Poland will receive 32% 
and Romania 29%. The CEC as a group would have a share 
of about 14% in the total EU-budget for rural development. 
The introduction of modulation in the CEC would 
reduce the total amount of direct payments in the CEC from 
6.2 bln. € to 5.8 bln. €, which is equivalent to -6.3%, see 
col. (7) and (8). This relatively small reduction in direct 
payment is caused by the high share of small producers in 
the new member countries, which fall within the € 5000 
franchise. While the amount of direct payments for the EU-
15 remains constant if modulation is introduced in the CEC, 
the amount available for rural development decreases 
significantly. In the EU-15 the budget of the 2
nd pillar is at 
9 bln. € instead of 10.6 bln. €, see columns (9) and (10). 
The EU payments for rural development in the CEC more 
than double from 1.8 bln. € to 3.8 bln. €, compared to a 
situation with the CEC being excluded from dynamic 
modulation. The CEC as a group would have a share of 
about 30% in the total EU-budget for rural development. It 
is important to note, however, that the full increase in the 
second pillar for the CEC is conditional on the complete 
use of the budget available. If parts of the rural 
development budget are not used by member states, they 
remain with the EU. 
Adding the budget for direct payments and rural 
development the countries of the EU-15 lose 1.6 bln. € if 
the CEC are included in the system of modulation, with 
Spain (-310 mill. €), France (-280 mill. €), Italy (-224 mill. 
€) and Germany (-203 mill. €) losing most, see column 
(13). The losses for the EU-15 are a net surplus for the 
group of new member countries. However, looking at the 
individual CEC, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia 
will receive less money for direct payments and rural 
development under the rules of modulation. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the above 
calculations? 
1. From a financial point of view, it is in the clear interest 
of the group of CEC to take part in the modulation 
mechanism if the distribution of the modulation budget is 
based on the criteria proposed by the Commission and if 
the CEC have the capacity to absorb available funds. 
2. If agricultural area and employment as well as prosperity 
are considered the “right indicators” for the distribution 
of the budget for rural development, CEC should be 
included in the modulation mechanism. According to 
these indicators, they should get at least 31% of the rural 
development budget (area criterion only), or more (66% 
according to the assumptions made in this article). 
Taking part in the modulation mechanism would increase 
their share from 14% to 30% - thus coming closer to the 
“right distribution”. 
3. Seemingly, the current implicit criteria determining the 
future distribution of the rural development budget 
between the EU-15 and the CEC are very different from 
the criteria proposed by the Commission for the 
distribution of the budget under dynamic modulation. 
One gets the impression that they are only to a very 
limited extent of any economic or social nature, as are 
those for the future distribution of direct payments. 
Distributional aspects are at the foreground.  
4. There is an urgent need for more transparent and well 
founded criteria for the distribution of the rural 
development budget. The relevance of the size of the 
agricultural sector, being covered by the area and 
employment criteria in the current proposal, is evident. 
The justification of a prosperity criterion is less clear: Is 
there more need for rural development measures in 
poorer countries? Does it make sense to cover this kind 
of distributional aims by agricultural policy instead of 
broader cohesion policies? 
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